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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE
SELECTION OF DISPUTES FOR LITIGATION
KEITH N. HYLTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

WHAT explains the decision to litigate rather than settle a dispute? The
standard theoretical approach to this question is a contract model that
suggests that parties will litigate when the set of mutually beneficial settlement agreements-that is, the contract zone-is empty.' The contract
zone may be empty because the parties have divergent expectations of
the trial outcome or because one party has more at stake than the other.2
The divergent-expectations explanation suggests that there are general
respects in which litigated disputes differ from settled disputes and that
one need not know the identities of litigants or the specific area of litigation in order to understand the differences between litigated and settled
disputes. The differential-stakes explanation implies that such information is necessary.3
The divergent-expectations theory of selection was developed in large

* Northwestern University School of Law. This article has benefited from comments
made by participants at the Summer 1991 Law and Society Meetings, Amsterdam, and from
suggestions by Ron Allen, John Donohue, Eric Rasmusen, Peter Siegelman, and David Van
Zandt.
1 The standard model was
developed in William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of
the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts,
2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973).
2 See, for
example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524-25 (3d ed. 1986).
3
For example, in order to use the differential-stakes theory to explain litigation patterns,
one will need to know whether the litigants are "repeat players" or "one-shot" litigants.
For discussion of these types of litigant and the differential-stakes theory generally, see
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc. Rev. 95 (1974).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXII (January 1993)]
? 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/93/2201-0003$01.50
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part by George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein.4 It predicts that plaintiffs
should win roughly 50 percent of their cases because the ones that are
litigated are those in which the outcome is most uncertain. In this set of
cases, the frequency with which plaintiffs win should be the same as the
frequency with which an unbiased coin will land "heads." Win rates that
diverge from this 50 percent prediction can be explained by differential
stakes or by other factors specific to the litigants or the area of litigation.
The evidence in favor of the 50 percent plaintiff win rate prediction is
subject to debate.5 Priest and Klein found evidence that supports it. William Baxter, who looked at antitrust cases, and Theodore Eisenberg,
who examined federal court cases, rejected the 50 percent hypothesis.6
Although the evidence is inconclusive, no alternative theory has been
proposed that suggests that win rates should, in general, be greater or
less than 50 percent.
This article presents a theory of the selection of disputes for litigation
that, like the Priest-Klein analysis, does not require information on the
identities of litigants. I show that win-rate patterns can be explained by
the informational requirements of the relevant legal standard. In areas
where the law requires information on the defendant's level of compliance with a legal standard and where defendants have more information
on this than plaintiffs do, win rates will be low (that is, below 50 percent).
If neither party has an informational advantage (the Priest-Klein model),
a 50 percent win rate should be observed. Alternatively, if the legal test
does not require information on the defendant's level of compliance or if
the plaintiff has the informational advantage, a high win rate may be
observed.
These results can be explained intuitively. Suppose that the legal test
concerns the defendant's level of compliance with a legal standard and
that the defendant has more information on her level of compliance than

4

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. L. Econ. & Org. 193
(1987). An earlier discussion that anticipates the core of the Priest-Klein hypothesis can be
found in William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William
Baxter (Robert D. Tollison ed. 1980). For extensions of the selection model, see Donald
Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985); Donald
Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of
the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. Legal Stud. 313 (1988).
5The plaintiff win rate is the number of disputes won by plaintiffs divided by the number
of disputes. Hereafter, I will use "win rate" instead of "plaintiff win rate."
6 William Baxter, supra note 4, at 23; and Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection
Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337 (1990).
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does the plaintiff.7As a result, the defendanthas a sharperestimate than
does the plaintiffof the likely outcome of a trial.
It follows that the guilty defendantwill be relativelypessimistic (compared to the plaintiff) and the innocent defendantwill be relatively optimistic about the outcome of a trial.8Assuming settlementis cheaperthan
litigation,disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only
innocentdefendants.Thus, guilty defendantswill be more likely to settle
than innocent defendants. Litigated cases will tend to oversample from
the pool of innocent defendants. Thus, the selection effect predicts a
tendency for litigation (where defendantshave the informationaladvantage) to involve innocent defendants.
Another issue raised by this article is why litigation ever occurs. I
argue that strategic behavior is a necessary condition for litigation. The
reason is simple. Consider (again) the case in which the defendant has
the informationaladvantage. If parties did not behave strategically,then
the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within
the contractzone for a guilty defendantwould reveal her innocence. The
partieswould then settle on terms that reflectthe defendant'strue status.
Thus, strategic behavior is central to any attempt to explain patternsof
litigation.9
If parties behave strategically,it is unlikely that, in equilibrium,innocent defendantswould reveal themselves by being the only ones to reject
settlement demands within a certain range. In any such equilibrium,
guilty defendants would have an incentive to reject similar settlement
7 In the model presented in Priest and Klein, supra note 4, which is the most rigorous
presentation of the standard model, neither party has an advantage in predicting the outcome of trial. Although Priest and Klein do not address this issue explicitly, the assumption
underlying their model seems to be that the defendant does not have an informational
advantage. Alternatively, the Priest-Klein model assumes any informational advantage possessed by the defendant cannot be used to make a more accurate prediction of the trial
outcome.
The assumption that the defendant has an informational advantage is made in Lucian
Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 Rand J. Econ.
404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 Rand J. Econ. 198 (1987);
I. P. L. Png, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J. Econ. 539 (1983);
and I. P. L. Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. Public Econ. 61 (1987).
Although these articles have implications for the selection literature, they do not offer
predictions concerning the win rate of plaintiffs in trials.
8 For simplicity, the defendant who has violated the legal standard will be referred to as
"guilty," and the defendant who has not violated the legal standard will be referred to
as "innocent."
9 See Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks, with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982).
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demands in order to appear innocent. It follows that the pool of defendants who reject settlement demands will include innocent and guilty
defendants but that the innocent most likely will outnumber the guilty.
In sum, two propositions predict that litigation in which the defendant
has the informational advantage will oversample innocent defendants.
First, disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only
innocent defendants. Second, the likely equilibrium of the settlementnegotiation process will be one in which the true status of defendants is
not revealed. Given the predicted oversampling of innocent defendants
in the pool of defendants who litigate, the win rate of plaintiffs should
tend toward the probability of an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff (type
II error). In this set of disputes, therefore, one should expect to find low
win rates.
I also present a brief discussion of some of the evidence on win rates.
I find that the predicted low win rates where defendants have the informational advantage is consistent with Eisenberg's data from federal court
cases and with studies reporting the behavior of win rates over time in
product-liability, antitrust, and employment-discrimination cases.'1
Two additional implications of the model are discussed. One is that, in
areas where the defendant has the informational advantage, attorneys'
estimates of the likelihood of the plaintiff winning-which, on average,
will be accurate if they make rational forecasts-will be greater than
objective measures of the win rate. This may explain the simultaneous
occurrence of low win rates in malpractice and product liability and reports of widespread fear of being sued in these areas. The second implication concerns doctrinal change. The selection model probably provides a
better explanation of some perceived doctrinal shifts than a model that
attributes change to the efforts of judges.
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents the model,
which extends the standard litigation model by taking into account informational constraints and efforts to rationally predict trial outcomes. I
develop conditions under which litigation (where defendants have the
informational advantage) tends to oversample innocent defendants. Section III discusses the evidence supporting the selection model presented.
Section IV discusses additional implications of the model.
10 On
product liability, see James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev.
479 (1990); on antitrust, see Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in Private Antitrust Litigation (Lawrence J. White
ed. 1988); on employment discrimination, see Peter Siegelman, The Influence of Macroeconomic Conditions on Plaintiff Win Rates in Unpublished Federal Employment Discrimination Cases (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 9012, 1990).
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THEORY

Standard Litigation Model

In the standard model of litigation,"l the plaintiff's minimum settlement
demand is equal to
PpJ-

Cp,

(1)

where Pp is the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a verdict in his
favor, Cp is the plaintiff's expected cost of litigating, and J is the size
of the damage award if the plaintiff wins.'2 The defendant's maximum
settlement offer is
PdJ + Cd,

(2)

where Pd is the defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. It is assumed that Cd, Cp, and J are fixed amounts
that are known by both sides. Since J is given, the stakes for the sides
are the same.13
A sufficient condition for litigation to occur is
(P - Pd)J > Cp + Cd.

(3)

Condition (3) implies that no mutually advantageous settlement can be
arranged between the defendant and the plaintiff because their beliefs
differ too much relative to the costs of litigation. If parties always settle
whenever settlement is mutually advantageous, then condition (3) is also
a necessary condition for litigation.
An additional requirement is that the plaintiff's threat to litigate must
be credible.14 If the plaintiff's threat to litigate were not credible, the
defendant would not have an incentive to make a positive settlement offer
in response to the plaintiff's settlement demand. The plaintiff's threat to
" See the articles cited in note 1 supra.
12
I have assumed that the cost of settling the suit is zero.
13 One can
easily incorporate disputes in which one party has more at stake than the
judgment. An example would be a defamation suit in which part of the plaintiff's gain from
bringing suit is the value of being seen defending his reputation.
14
See, for example, Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? supra note 4,
at 186-87; Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982). This requirement can be viewed as an application of the perfectness notion in game theory; see, for
example, Shavell at 74. See Nalebuff, supra note 7, for explicit consideration of this in a
formal model of the litigation process.
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litigate is credible if
PpJ - Cp > 0.
B.

(4)

Information and Error

Consider a dispute where the victim (plaintiff) has suffered an injury
at the hands of the injurer (defendant). Assume information is asymmetric
because the defendant knows whether she violated the relevant legal
standard while the plaintiff does not. Let W denote the plaintiff's rationalexpectations estimate of the probability that the defendant violated the
legal standard, given an injury suffered at the hands of the defendant.
The plaintiff bases his estimate of W on observations that are correlated
with the defendant's level of compliance with the legal standard and on
information concerning the probability distributions of characteristics a
court would use in evaluating compliance.
Let Q1 be the probability that a defendant who has violated the legal
standard will be found not liable (alternatively, the probability of type I
error). Let Q2 be the probability that a defendant who has not violated
the legal standard will be found liable (the probability of type II error). I
assume that15
1-

- Q2> 0

(5)

No attempt is made to distinguish between the plaintiff's and the defendant's estimates of the error probabilities. To simplify, I assume that
both estimates are the same and equal to the corresponding objective
frequencies because they are based on public information.16
The plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable verdict is
(6)
p = W(1 - Q) + (1 - W)Q2.

15 This

assumption on error probabilities is made in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L. Econ. & Org.
99, 101 (1989). The condition embodies two assumptions: (1) that the probability that a guilty
defendant will be found innocent is less than the probability that an innocent defendant will
be found innocent, and (2) that the probability that an innocent defendant will be found
guilty is less than the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty. The assumptions are reasonable accuracy requirements.
16 For
example, if the estimates of error probabilities are based on information concerning
the predispositions of judges, it is assumed that this information is known to both parties.
This assumption could be relaxed by allowing one party to have more information about
the judge's "leanings" than the other. For discussion of the influence of information on
judges' predispositions on litigation, see George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399, 408 (1980).
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Under the assumption that she knows whether or not she violated the
legal standard, the defendant's estimate of the probability of a favorable
verdict for the plaintiff is
(7a)
Pd = 1 - Ql
if the defendant violated the legal standard and
Pd = Q2

(7b)

if the defendant did not violate the legal standard.
1. If the defendant violated the legal standard, then her
PROPOSITION
estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff will be greater
than or equal to the plaintiff's. If the defendant did not violate the legal
standard, then her estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff
will be less than or equal to the plaintiff's.
The intuition supporting proposition 1 is straightforward. If the court
meets the accuracy requirement in condition (5), defendants who have
violated the legal standard will have a higher estimate of the probability
of a verdict for the plaintiff than will the plaintiff. Similarly, defendants
who have not violated the standard will have a lower estimate.17 The
reason for this result is that the plaintiff forms his prediction of the probability of a favorable verdict by averaging over two populations of potential injurers: those who would have violated the standard (discounting the
estimate by the probability that type I error does not occur) and those
who would not have violated the standard (discounting the latter estimate
by the probability of type II error). The plaintiff's rational-expectations
estimate of a verdict in his favor therefore is less than the probability
that type I error does not occur (the estimate used by a guilty defendant)
and greater than the probability that type II error does occur (the estimate
used by an innocent defendant).
C.

Litigation and Settlement

An immediate implication of proposition 1 and the sufficient condition
for litigation (see [3]) is as follows.
2. The sufficient condition for litigation is never satisfied
PROPOSITION
in a dispute involving a guilty defendant.
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that (3) cannot hold if the defendant is
guilty.

Since 1 - Q < Q2, it follows that, for guilty defendants, 1 - Ql > Pp unless W = 1,
and, for innocent defendants, Q2 < Pp unless W = 0.
17
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Proposition 2 implies that if all litigation were determined by the nonexistence of a mutually beneficial settlement agreement, then every instance
of litigation would involve a defendant who is innocent of violating the
legal standard. Thus, the win rate of plaintiffs would be equal to the rate
of erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff.
The difficulty with this conclusion is that it ignores the information
conveyed by the settlement process. We know that the parties will always
choose to settle rather than litigate if the settlement payment is below
the defendant's maximum offer and above the plaintiff's minimum demand. If only innocent defendants chose litigation over settlement, then
the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within
the contract zone for a guilty defendant would reveal her innocence. A
rational plaintiff therefore would revise his estimate of the probability of
a verdict in his favor, so that it reflects the belief that the defendant is
innocent. Since their estimates of the trial outcome then would be the
same, the parties would settle to avoid the cost of litigation.'8 In short,
if parties did not behave strategically, there would be no litigation. The
disputes involving guilty defendants would be settled because the parties'
on information available before
estimates of the trial outcome-based
settlement negotiations-would
permit settlement agreements to occur
(that is, the contract zone would not be empty). The disputes involving
innocent defendants would be settled because their refusal to accept initial settlement demands would reveal their innocence.
Now introduce strategic behavior. Suppose the plaintiff starts with an
initial demand D1 that is in the contract zone only for a guilty defendant.'9
If the defendant is innocent, she will reject this demand. Surprisingly, if
the defendant is guilty, she may also have an incentive to reject the
demand in order to fool the plaintiff into thinking her innocent.20 Indeed,
any outcome in which only innocent defendants reject settlement demands that fall within a guilty defendant's contract zone could not be an
equilibrium because guilty defendants would also reject such demands.
Given the strategic behavior of guilty defendants, the plaintiff may not
reduce his settlement demand to a level within an innocent defendant's
contract zone.21 To see this, suppose the frequency with which the defen18 The
parties would settle (for some positive amount) if plaintiff's threat to litigate
remained credible, that is, if Q2J - Cp > 0. If his threat were not credible, then the plaintiff
would drop his claim (equivalently, settle for zero dollars).
19
Specifically, Dl is greater than [W(l - Ql) + (1 - W)Q2]J - Cp and less than (1 Q )J + Cd.
20 See
Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, supra note 7.
21 A demand within an innocent defendant's contract zone would be one that is less than
Q2J + Cd.
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dant rejects the ith settlement demand, given that she is guilty, is Si.
Equilibrium requires Si > 0 for each period of the negotiation process
(save the last). The probability that the innocent defendant will reject the
initial demand is one. Using Bayes's rule, the probability that a defendant
is guilty, given rejection of the initial demand, is S W/[S W + (1 - W)].
The plaintiff's initial estimate of the probability of a negligence verdict
is W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2, and his revised estimate is
{S, WI[S1W + (1 - W)]}(1 -

Q1)+ {1 - S, W/[S1W + (1 - W)]}Q2. (8)

Because S, > 0, the revised estimate will be greater than Q2, and the
revised minimum demand will exceed the demand that would be offered
to a defendant who is known to be innocent.
The possibility of strategic behavior suggests that litigation may occur
because an equilibrium will not exist in which only innocent defendants
reject settlement demands (alternatively, mixed strategies are necessary).
The proportion of guilty defendants who reject settlement demands may
be too high for plaintiffs to rationally offer settlement demands within
an innocent defendant's contract zone. In response to rejections, some
plaintiffs will bring suit.22
Among the defendants who reject settlement demands, the proportion
of innocent defendants is SiWI[SiW + (1 - W)], and the proportion of
guilty defendants is (1 - W)/[SiW + (1 - W)]. It follows that among
rejecters of settlement demands, the innocent will outnumber the guilty
if
SiW<

- W,

(9)

which is likely to hold generally.23 An additional reason for predicting
that (9) will hold is that rejection is a signaling device, likely to be used

22
See Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, supra note 7. Although Png's
model offers a rigorous justification for the basic claim of this section, its assumptions are
restrictive. His model assumes that settlement is a two-period game in which the defendant
first makes an offer and the plaintiff responds by accepting or bringing suit. An alternative
model is one in which the defendant makes the last move by deciding whether to accept or
reject a settlement demand. In this alternative model, it is more difficult to make sense of
litigation, especially litigation involving guilty defendants. The reason is that, at the end
period of the game, each defendant would accept any settlement offer within the contract
zone. It follows then that only two types of equilibria could result: a pooling equilibrium in
which all parties settle and a separating equilibrium in which only innocent parties litigate.
Litigation against guilty defendants could be explained in two ways. One is that some
plaintiffs will break off settlement negotiations and bring suit before the end period arrives.
The other is that the end period is not really an end period, given the likelihood of an
appeal.
23
Note that (9) holds unambiguously for any W < 1/2.
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strategically when it is a strong signal of innocence, which is consistent
with (9).24

The Influence of Uncertainty. A central proposition of the PriestKlein model of selection is that disputes in which the evidence points
strongly toward either innocence or guilt are more likely to settle than
those in which it does not. The proposition holds in the model presented
here.
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff
suggests that the defendant was far from compliance with the legal standard. In this case, W will be close to one, and Q1and Q2 close to zero.
Under these assumptions, rejection of a settlement demand at best will
send a weak signal of innocence to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would not
have an incentive to make a substantial reduction in his initial settlement
demand because, he would reason, very few innocent injurers would
find themselves in the defendant's position.25 Since the likely gain from
rejecting a demand within the contract zone is very small, a guilty defendant will seldom have an incentive to use rejection strategically.
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff
suggests that the defendant did not violate the legal standard. Under this
assumption, the plaintiff's threat to sue will not generally be credible, so
that neither litigation nor settlement will occur. If the plaintiff's threat to
sue is credible, settlement is likely. Since very few of the injurers will be
guilty, rejection will be a strong signal of innocence, which implies that
the plaintiff should be willing to reduce his demand to a level acceptable
to the defendant.
The Influence of Legal Error. Instead of a reduction in uncertainty,
consider a reduction in the likelihood of legal error. In other words, the
evidence specific to each dispute is no clearer, but the court is less likely
to decide incorrectly (that is, Q1 and Q2 approach zero). A reduction in
the likelihood of error increases the distance between the expected liability of an innocent defendant, Q2J + Cd, and the expected liability of a
guilty defendant, (1 - Q )J + Cd. This increases the zone of acceptable
settlement demands for guilty defendants and increases the zone of unacceptable settlement demands for innocent defendants. The likely result
is an increase in the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate.
24

Note that there would be no incentive for a guilty defendant to use rejection strategically when S, = 1.
25 A more
precise explanation follows. The plaintiff's downward revision of Pp after
rejection of the initial settlement demand will be significant only if S1W/[S1W + (1 - W)]
< W. Moreover, the greater the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 - W)] and W, the
greater will be the plaintiff's downward revision of Pp. If W is very close to one, however,
the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 - W)] and W will be very small, whatever the value
of S1.
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The Selection Effect and the Win Rate

Let n2 represent the number of innocent defendants who litigate, and
let n1 represent the number of guilty defendants who litigate. Both the
Priest-Klein model and my model suggest that litigants will be drawn
largely from disputes in which the evidence does not strongly suggest
whether or not the defendant has complied with the relevant legal standard. Let Q m and Q2mrepresent the mean error rates for this set of
disputes. The win rate of plaintiffs can be approximated by
V = [nl(l - Qlm) + n2Q2]/N,

(10)

where N is equal to the sum of n1 and n2.
This model suggests that innocent defendants should be the largest
category of defendants who litigate. If the selection effect operates as
anticipated by this model, the win rate (see [10]) will be less than the
average plaintiff's initial estimate of the probability of a verdict in his
favor.26
Is it possible to predict whether the win rate will be less than or greater
than 50 percent, or whether it will fall over time? In general, the answer
seems to be no. The formula for the plaintiffs' win rate (eq. [10]) can take
any value between 1 - Q1mand Q2m. Plausible conditions under which
the win rate will be below 50 percent, however, can be stated. It follows
from (10) that, if Qlm is roughly equal to Q2mand if both Qlm and Q2m
are less than 1/2,27 then the selection effect implies that the win rate will
be less than 50 percent.
The behavior of the win rate over time can also be established. Imagine
the existence of some technology that reduces the likelihood of judicial
error, and suppose that it reduces the frequencies of type I and type
II error at equal rates. The obvious candidate for this error-reducing
technology is the stock of legal doctrine.28 Letting Z represent the stock
26
This follows from (6). The average plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable
verdict is found by averaging Pp over all plaintiffs (at each point along the evidence spectrum). But the selection process described in Sec. IIC implies that, at each point along the
evidence spectrum, W (the ratio of violators to injurers) is greater than the ratio of guilty
defendants to defendants because a disproportionate share of the guilty injurers settle.
27
There seems to be no reliable data on error rates. Tullock, however, argues that a
rough estimate of the "probability of error" is 1/8. See Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial:
The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure 31-33 (1980).
28 The error rates in this model
may be interpreted as measuring or reflecting the frequency of inconsistent decisions that should fall as the doctrine is elaborated. Of course,
whether growth in legal doctrine caused by litigation clarifies the doctrine is a subject of
debate. Out of disdain for what he perceived as inescapable ambiguity in the common law,
Jeremy Bentham devoted considerable effort to lobbying in favor of a civil code that could
replace it. See H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 73, 76-78 (1982). Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law 111-29 (1881), argued that legal standards become clearer over time.
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of legal doctrine, I assume that dQ mldZ = dQ2m,dZ < 0. Suppose further
that Q,mand Q2m are roughly equal, and let the common value be Q. The
effect of a small increase in Z on the win rate of plaintiffs therefore is
dVpldZ = [1 - 2(nl/N)]dQldZ

+ [d(n1lN)ldZ](1 - 2Q).

(11)

The first term in (11) is negative because n/lN < 1/2. The second term
also is likely to be negative because the proportion of innocent defendants
will probably increase as error rates fall (that is, n1/N will fall as Z increases), and Q will generally be less than 1/2. Thus, the win rate of
plaintiffs falls with a reduction in error if the selection effect operates as
predicted by this model.
The falling-win-rate prediction can be explained intuitively: the downward trend results from a reduction in the error rate and from a change
in the mix of cases coming to trial. The win rate falls as the error rate falls
because the number of erroneous verdicts against innocent defendants
declines. Since the selection effect implies that innocents will make up
the majority of defendants, the net effect of a reduction in error is a
reduction in the win rate. The mix of cases coming to trial reduces the
win rate because, as error rates fall, the proportion of cases involving
innocent defendants will increase. The reason for this is that, other things
being equal, a reduction in error will increase the zone of acceptable
settlement demands for guilty defendants and the zone of unacceptable
settlement demands for innocent defendants.
Two hypotheses emerge. First, assuming that error rates are relatively
small, an observation of a win rate less than 50 percent is evidence that
the selection effect operates as anticipated. Second, a win rate that falls
over time can be taken as weak evidence that the selection effect operates
as anticipated. A related, though weaker hypothesis is that the rate at
which disputes are litigated should fall over time.29

The reason error rates fall over time is that, as doctrine develops, fewer issues relevant to
the compliance question are left entirely to the jury. In the limit, the question of compliance
itself is decided by the judge according to rules that have been developed in earlier cases.
For an argument that is broadly similar but focuses on incentives to litigate, see William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
19 J. Law & Econ. 249 (1976).
29 This is a weaker
hypothesis because it is also consistent with the Priest-Klein theory.
The Priest-Klein model, however, does not imply that the plaintiff win rate, in most cases,
will fall over time; indeed, such an observation would be inconsistent with the Priest-Klein
theory.
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EVIDENCE

Predictions

The model discussed in Section IIB is one in which the defendant
has the informational advantage. If the plaintiff has the informational
advantage, its implications are reversed. Thus, the general implications
of this article's theory for the pattern of win rates can be summarized as
follows. (a) In areas in which the legal test requires an examination of
the defendant's compliance with a legal standard and defendants have
the informational advantage, low win rates should be observed. (b) In
areas in which the legal test requires an examination of the defendant's
compliance with a legal standard and plaintiffs have the informational
advantage, high win rates should be observed. (c) In areas in which the
legal test requires an examination of the defendant's level of compliance
and neither party has an informational advantage (the Priest-Klein
model), win rates of 50 percent (the Priest-Klein prediction) should be
observed.
Some additional implications follow. In areas of litigation in which the
defendant has the informational advantage, one should observe win rates
that fall over time. Since the error rate falls over time, fewer verdicts
against innocent defendants (who make up the majority of defendants)
will occur, and the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate will
increase. Where the plaintiff has the informational advantage one should
observe rising win rates over time because, as the error rate falls, fewer
guilty defendants (who make up the majority) are found innocent and the
proportion of guilty defendants who litigate will increase. Where neither
party has the informational advantage, a stable 50 percent win rate should
be observed.
Informational distinctions often can be drawn for different categories
of litigation. One distinction is between contract and tort litigation. On
one hand, the informational-advantage question is likely to be less clear
in the contract area because contract disputes involve issues that may
give either party an informational advantage. Whether there was an intention to offer or to accept, the rules governing contract interpretation, and
the doctrines of mistake, reliance, and consideration all require some
examination of information that the plaintiff is likely to possess. On the
other hand, some tort disputes involve only the defendant's level of compliance. In these disputes, defendants will most likely have the informational advantage. Within the set of tort disputes, further distinctions can
be made. Disputes involving issues of contributory or comparative negli-
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gence are not likely to be ones in which either party has an informational
advantage. Thus, the prediction of low win rates should be observed in
tort disputes in which compliance on the part of the defendant is the
principal issue.

B.

Data

Tables Al, A2, and A3 of the Appendix present the win-rate data of
the Eisenberg, Daniels and Martin, and Priest and Klein studies.30 The
data are consistent with the predictions of this article's model. Eisenberg's data show that win rates are generally higher in contract disputes
than in tort disputes (Table Al). The same pattern is observed comparing
win rates in tort and intellectual-property cases, which are likely to be
similar to contract disputes in the scope of their informational demands.
Win rates within tort disputes also are in line with the model's predictions. In Tables Al and A2, the tort disputes with win rates consistently
lower than 50 percent are areas in which only the defendant's compliance
matters-malpractice and product-liability litigation.31 Eisenberg's data
seem to support the general claim that the substantial areas of litigation
in which the defendant is likely to possess an informational advantage are
those in which win rates are low. Antitrust, malpractice, product-liability,
employment-discrimination (jobs in Table Al), and civil-rights32cases fall
in this category.33
30
Eisenberg, supra note 6; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the
"Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 Just. Sys. J. 321 (1986); and Priest & Klein, supra note 4.
31 Table A2 may reveal another distinction among the tort disputes: win rates are lower
in negligence/contributory-negligence jurisdictions. The relatively low plaintiff win rates in
the "vehicular accidents" column for the Missouri counties may reflect the fact that, over
most of the period covered, these counties had a contributory-negligence system while most
other jurisdictions in the sample had comparative-negligence systems. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 30, at 331-32. One could argue that, because the informational requirements
of comparative negligence are greater (degrees of negligence must be assessed under comparative negligence, while any significant negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars recovery
under contributory negligence), the data are entirely consistent with the theory presented
in this article. This is not clearly supported by Table A2, however, because the data measure
gross instead of net awards. It is possible that the difference between measured win rates
under comparative and contributory negligence in large part reflects the method of measuring awards.
32 The
"civil-rights" cases in the Eisenberg data set include Fifth Amendment claims,
actions brought under civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. ?? 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988), and discrimination claims involving federally assisted programs (42 U.S.C. ? 2000). See Theodore
Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77
Geo. L. J. 1567, 1574 (1989).
33 The low win rate reported in Table Al for antitrust cases is a consistent finding (indeed,
the figure in Table Al is higher than the level reported in most studies). Baxter, supra note
4, at 17, reported win rates ranging from 4.9 percent in 1964 to 22.6 percent in 1970 (the
seven-year average was 15.2 percent). See also Salop & White, supra note 10, at 40-42.
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The Priest-Klein selection model implies that win rates should be 50
percent generally, and that deviations from 50 percent can be explained
by differential stakes. The data ("disaggregated" into subfields of litigation) reported in the Eisenberg and the Daniels and Martin studies seem
to be inconsistent with this hypothesis, unless one believes that the vast
majority of areas of litigation involve parties who have different stakes.34
The theory presented here is consistent with the disaggregated pattern of
win rates and has the advantage of not being reducible to the claim that
each win rate can be explained only by litigant-specific factors. The low
win rates observed in antitrust, malpractice, and civil-rights litigation are
not exceptional cases that need to be explained by litigant-specific theories; these are areas in which this article's hypothesized selection effect
receives its strongest support.
There are other empirical problems with the differential-stakes theory.
First, although it may provide a reasonable explanation of low win rates
in malpractice and product-liability litigation, it does not explain satisfactorily the low win rate in employment-discrimination cases. A doctor who
is a defendant in a malpractice dispute may have more at stake than the
plaintiff because an adverse judgment reflects on the quality of her service. A manufacturer shares a similar concern about her product but also
the concern that an adverse judgment will lead to additional suits. Neither
of these explanations seems to fit in the employment-discrimination category.35
The second problem for the differential-stakes hypothesis is, if it explains the low win rate in product-liability tort suits, what explains the
high win rate in product-liability contract disputes (Table Al)? The differential stakes theory predicts low win rates in both product-liability tort
and contract disputes. To be sure, if product-liability contract disputes
largely involve breaches of an express warranty, there may be less concern that an adverse judgment will lead to a flood of litigation. Still, an

34 It should be noted, however, that Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 7,
suggest that their
theory probably would not apply to comparative-negligence cases. Given this, the data in
Daniels & Martin, supra note 30, may not be inconsistent with the Baxter-Priest-Klein
prediction.
35 Of course, it is possible that a defendant who loses an employment-discrimination suit
may be sued by others or may incur costs in addition to damages and legal expenses. For
example, an employer who cannot use a certain standardized test because it violates the
disparate-impact doctrine may experience a large increase in hiring costs. The probability
of suits by similar victims or of an injunction that will increase operating costs, however,
is small in the typical employment-discrimination suit-a discriminatory-discharge claim.
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991). It follows that the reputational consequences
of the loss of a typical employment-discrimination lawsuit are likely to be insignificant.
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adverse judgment is a negative statement about the quality of the defendant's product, and this suggests that the defendant will have more at
stake than the plaintiff.
The third problem (noted by Priest and Klein) is that the differentialstakes theory does not explain the high win rate in worker-injury suits
against nonemployers (Table A3).36 The informational-asymmetry model
suggests a possible reason. These injuries are likely to be influenced by
the care of both parties, and, since the injurer cannot observe the plaintiff's level of care, it is possible that the plaintiff has the informational
advantage.
One might argue that the fact that awards are generally higher in malpractice and product-liability suits, even though win rates are lower contradicts the informational-advantage theory. Thus, it may seem unlikely
that the low win rates in these areas reflect a tendency of "guilty" defendants to settle at higher rates than "innocent" defendants. Higher awards
in malpractice and product-liability cases, however, are not inconsistent
with the model. First, the awards are likely to be against defendants who
have violated the relevant legal standard. Second, given the high cost of
litigating in these areas, it is not surprising that average awards are also
high. Only plaintiffs who can claim substantial awards will have an incentive to bring suit.
An alternative explanation for the win-rate pattern in tort cases is that
weaker cases are being brought in anticipation of larger awards.37 There
are several reasons to doubt this. The first, noted by Eisenberg, is that
win rates are low in other areas, such as civil rights, without correspondingly high damage awards.38A second reason is that the incentive to bring
suit does not depend only on the damage award but also on the economic
return from bringing suit, which requires subtracting the cost of bringing
suit from the damage award (and correcting for risk, too). Unless the
economic return from bringing suit is greater in product-liability and malpractice cases-and this has not been shown-there is no reason to believe that plaintiffs have incentives to bring weaker claims in anticipation
of higher awards in the product-liability and malpractice areas.
Although the Priest-Klein prediction of a 50 percent win rate may hold
generally in aggregated data, it does not appear to hold when the data
are disaggregated across areas of litigation.39 The theory presented here
36 The
typical defendants in the sample are nonemployer construction companies, building owners, or architects; Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 43.
37 See Wittman, Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 313, 337.
38 Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1580.
39 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: New Data on Pretrial Bargaining, the Selection of Cases for Trial, and Jury Verdicts in Civil Cases (unpublished
manuscript, Univ. Michigan Law School 1990).
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may provide an explanation for this difference. As one aggregates win
rates from several litigation fields, the influence of any type of informational asymmetry characteristic of a given litigation field is diminished.
Therefore, the aggregate win rate will approximate 50 percent as predicted by the Priest-Klein model, which assumes no informational advantages.
An additional though somewhat weaker prediction of my model is that,
when defendants have the informational advantage, win rates should fall
over time. Few empirical studies have examined the behavior of win
rates over time; however, the three studies of which I am aware-one
examining antitrust,40another federal employment discrimination cases,41
and the third product-liability litigation42-reveal that win rates have been
falling in these areas after an initial period of doctrinal development. The
Steven Salop and Lawrence White study of private antitrust litigation
reveals that the average win rate of plaintiffs fell from 17 percent before
1974 to 48 percent in the 1980s.43Peter Siegelman's examination of federal
employment-discrimination litigation demonstrates that the win rate has
fallen from 1977 to 1988.44James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg's
study of federal court product-liability cases reveals that, after expansions in product liability over the 1960s and 1970s,45 the win rate has
fallen over the 1980s.46If the low win rates observed in antitrust, employment-discrimination, and product-liability cases are due to the selection
effect, as described in this article, then the fact that these win rates have
been falling provides additional support for the theory.
IV.

SOMEADDITIONALIMPLICATIONS

In addition to explaining win-rate patterns, the theory presented in this
article has implications on the divergence between observed win rates
and perceptions of the likelihood of plaintiff success and on theories of
doctrinal change.
If the selection effect operates as described here, one should expect to
find plaintiffs' attorneys more optimistic than seems warranted by objective measures of win rates in areas such as malpractice and product liability where defendants have the informational advantage. Similarly, in any
40 Salop & White, supra note 10.
41

Siegelman, supra note 10.
Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10.
43 Salop & White, supra note 10, at 40.
44 Siegelman, supra note 10, at 8, 15.
45 See, for example, W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 692-702 (1984).
46 Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 506, 508, 525.
42
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area where plaintiffs have the informational advantage, one should expect
to find overly pessimistic assessments of the plaintiff's likelihood of winning a suit. This hypothesis could be tested by comparing the average
attorneys' subjective estimate of the probability of winning, say, a malpractice suit to the objective measures of win rates in malpractice cases.
I am aware of no empirical study that compares attorneys' subjective
estimates of the likelihood of winning to objective measures of win rates.
Press reports and the liability literature, however, generally have reflected frequently voiced concerns over doctrinal expansion and increased litigation in malpractice and product liability even though these
win rates have remained well below 50 percent.47 This may be due to a
general perception on the part of attorneys that the probability of success
is relatively high in these areas in spite of low win rates, which may
largely reflect settlement patterns. Indeed, Peter Huber has claimed that
the "likelihood of success rose from 20 to 30 percent in a product case
in the 1960s to more than 50 percent in the 1980s."48 Since Huber could
not have gotten his "more than 50 percent" figure from observations of
win rates, he must have arrived at it through talking to attorneys. Huber's
estimate may be a reasonably accurate description of the average product-liability attorney's subjective estimate of the probability of success.
A second implication of this article concerns legal-research methodology. Both my model and the Priest-Klein selection theory imply a potential bias in concluding from court opinions that the law in a given area is
shifting to either a proplaintiff or a prodefendant stance. The selection
process implies that the deterrent effect of a legal regime, specifically its
ability to make actors comply with legal rules, cannot easily be inferred
from trends in court decisions or plaintiff win rates. In my model, for
example, innocent defendants will be most heavily oversampled among
litigated disputes when potential injurers are generally complying with
the law.49 Such oversampling could lead to a stream of court opinions
that seem either neutral or prodefendant and, at the least, will influence
the set of issues that reach appellate courts. A legal researcher who infers
that the legal regime is shifting in favor of defendants could easily be
wrong. The generally accepted approach of inferring a change in the legal
47 See, for example, Robert E. Litan, Peter Swire, & Clifford Winston, The U.S. Liability
System: Background and Trends in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 8 (Robert E. Litan
& Clifford Winston eds. 1988).
48 Peter Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 10 (1988). "More
than 50 percent" is a vast overstatement of the plaintiff win rate in product-liability litigation.
49 If W is small (less than 1/2), then the proportion of defendants who reject settlement
demands and are innocent, SiW/[SiW + (1 - W)], will be greater than the proportion of
rejecters who are guilty, (1 - W)I[SiW + (1 - W)], and innocent defendants will be
oversampled in the set of litigated disputes.
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regime from a perceived change in legal doctrine ignores the possibility
that the doctrinal shift may reflect, for the most part, a change in the type
of case that is being litigated.
This criticism applies to all theories that treat doctrinal change as the
result of conscious efforts on the part of judges. Consider, for example,
the claim that the modifications in nineteenth-century tort doctrinerevealed by the larger number of opinions discussing the level of care
exercised by the defendant-reflected an effort on the part of judges to
subsidize industry.50 This ignores the possibility that, over the relevant
period, the typical defendant standing before the judge may have changed
from one whose lack of care was obvious to one who had taken substantial precautions. The criticism also applies to the claim that judgments in
favor of defendants in product-liability cases reflect an attempt by judges
to reverse the trend of expanding liability for manufacturers.51
Judicial-effort theories treat legal doctrine as being shaped through the
collective efforts of judges. They typically fail to provide a reason why
judges would decide to work together to change a particular doctrine. In
contrast, selection models suggest that doctrinal change is the result of
an evolutionary process. Just as the characteristics that are most likely
to be observed within a species in the next generation are associated with
the genes likely to be passed on to that generation, the disputes that are
most likely to influence legal doctrine tomorrow are those in which the
settlement gap-is greatdivergence in the litigants' expectations-the
est. Under the Priest-Klein model, since neither party has an informational advantage, the disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will
contain roughly equal subpopulations of innocent and guilty defendants.
In the model presented here, in torts where only the defendant's care
matters, disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will contain a
disproportionate share of innocent defendants. This imbalance should
influence the menu of issues reaching appellate courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article offers a new theory of the distinction between settled and
litigated cases. The standard theory predicts a 50 percent win rate for
plaintiffs. My theory predicts that the plaintiff win rate will be less than
50 percent in areas where defendants have the informational advantage
in litigation and greater than 50 percent if the converse holds. A 50 percent win rate will be observed in areas where neither party has the informational advantage in litigation.
50 M.
51

Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 85-99 (1977).
Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10.

DATA APPENDIX
TABLE Al
PLAINTIFFSUCCESSRATES AT TRIAL BY CASE CATEGORY,

FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURTS,1978-85

Contract:
Insurance
Marine
Miller Act
Negotiable instruments
Recovery of overpayments and enforcement of
judgments
Recovery of defaulted student loans
Recovery of overpayments of veteran benefits
Other contract actions
Contract product liability
Torts: personal injury:
Airplane
Airplane product liability
Assault, libel, and slander
Federal employers' liability
Marine
Marine: product liability
Motor vehicle
Motor vehicle: product liability
Other personal injury
Personal injury: medical malpractice
Personal injury: product liability
Torts: personal property damage:
Other fraud
Truth in lending
Other personal property damage
Property damage-product liability
Civil rights:
Other civil rights
Voting
Jobs
Accommodations
Welfare
Property rights:
Copyright
Patent
Trademark
Other statutes:
Antitrust

Administrative
Office Code

N

Success
Rate

110
120
130
140

2,494
1,089
285
560

.52
.69
.79
.78

150
152
153
190
195

128
19
51
6,643
252

.77
.84
.80
.64
.57

310
315
320
330
340
345
350
355
360
362
365

448
149
490
890
2,429
46
3,261
392
3,808
697
3,255

.55
.40
.42
.72
.59
.37
.60
.33
.46
.38
.25

370
371
380
365

716
10
980
3,255

.60
.60
.59
.25

440
441
442
443
444

4,970
118
7,165
223
59

.33
.53
.21
.43
.47

820
830
840

243
473
407

.71
.48
.67

410

586

.43

SOURCE.-Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337, 357, table Al (1970).
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TABLE A2

PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES IN SELECTED TYPES OF REPORTED TORT CASES (PLAINTIFF W

TYPE OF TORT CASE

Vehicular
Accidents
SITE

Arizona Superior Court,
1981-85:
Maricopa
California Superior Court,
1981-84:
Alameda
Fresno
Los Angeles
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Georgia Superior Court,
1982-84:
Cobb
De Kalb
Fulton
Illinois Circuit Court,
1981-85:
Cook
DuPage
Kane
Lake
McHenry
Will
Winnebago

Product
Liability

Medical
Malpractice

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

66.1

628

44.1

58

27.8

55

66.3
64.1
66.3
62.6
59.0
66.2

83
39
637
91
134
154

45.8
25.0
43.7
9.5
30.0
44.0

24
4
214
21
20
25

33.3
.0
31.0
26.1
42.1
48.3

24
6
245
23
38
29

63.0
46.3
49.4

27
95
164

100.0
..
29.4

1
0
17

12.5
29.4
45.7

8
17
35

59.9
63.2
65.4
71.2
63.0
72.3
63.3

2504
239
78
146
27
148
60

34.8
.0
40.0
.0
50.0
25.0
40.0

134
7
5
6
2
4
5

33.8
17.9
33.3
47.4
25.0
18.2
25.0

134
28
10
19
8
22
8

TABLE A2 (Continued)
TYPEOFTORTCASE
Vehicular
Accidents

Product
Liability

Medical
Malpractice

00

SITE

Kansas District Court,
1981-85:
Johnson
Wyandotte
Missouri Circuit Court,
1981-85:
Clay
Jackson
Platte
New York Supreme, Civil,
and County Courts,
1981-84:
Bronx
Erie
King
Monroe

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

58.8
65.0

114
143

37.5
28.6

16
7

47.1
50.0

17
10

48.6
48.8
53.3

35
291
15

50.0
56.0

4
25
0

75.0
26.3
.0

4
38
1

77.7
64.6
67.8
70.4

112
48
304
27

66.7
25.0
42.9
66.7

15
8
7
3

51.2
15.4
46.2
.0

43
13
130
1

:

\o

Nassau
New York
Onondaga
Queens
Richmond
Suffolk
Westchester
Oregon Circuit Court,
1984-85:
Multnomah
Texas District and County
Court:
Bexar, 1982-84
Dallas, 1981-85
Harris, 1981-85
Washington Superior Court,
1983-85:
King
Pierce
Skagit
Snohomish
Spokane
Yakima

50.7
79.0
56.3
57.6
75.6
60.1
49.4

215
195
16
170
45
199
87

28.6
60.7
66.7
50.0
50.0
42.9
16.7

14
28
3
10
2
14
6

33.3
45.0
20.0
45.1
22.2
46.2
17.9

90
169
5
71
9
26
39

61.7

115

50.0

16

50.0

18

50.8
47.5
61.3

122
301
614

28.6
30.8
36.5

21
40
85

10.5
20.5
10.9

19
44
119

75.4
80.0
90.0
80.4
80.3
81.5

183
50
10
46
66
27

58.8
60.0

17
5
0
4
5
4

25.0
25.0
.
25.0
60.0
50.0

32
8
0
4
5
6

.

.

.

25.0
60.0
25.0

SOURCE.-Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 Just. Sys. J. 321
NOTE.-Column 1 = the percentage of successful verdicts; col. 2 = the total number of verdicts.
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TABLE A3

PROPORTION OF PLAINTIFF VICTORIES IN CONTESTED CIVIL CASES TRIED TO JURIES BY CASE

1959-79
TYPE,COOKCOUNTY,ILLINOIS,
PLAINTIFF
VICTORIES
CASE TYPE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Traffic
Common carrier
Injury on property
Street hazard
Dramshop
Worker injury
Product liability
Malpractice
Assault, dignitary harm, business tort
Total traffic
Total nontraffic
Total all cases

Percent

Total Cases

47.4
52.3
47.8
55.6
53.8
66.3
42.8
39.6
53.9

9,987
879
1,396
399
371
775
477
202
1,013

47.79
52.50

10,866
4,633
15,499

L. Priestand BenjaminKlein, The Selectionof Disputesfor Litigation,13 J. Legal
SOURCE.-George
Stud. 1, table 7 (1984).

